




**Director of  
Central  
Intelligence**

**Top Secret**

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# **National Intelligence Daily**

***Friday  
18 September 1981***

**Top Secret**

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## POLAND: Union Under Pressure

*The regime continues to press the union to moderate its behavior even though Solidarity's initial response to the Politburo statement was relatively restrained.* [ ]

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Prime Minister Jaruzelski yesterday chaired an all day "extraordinary" session of the Council of Ministers, which will issue a communique today. Warsaw also signaled to the country yesterday that it is under pressure from the Soviets by announcing that the Soviet Ambassador had passed the contents of a Soviet party Central Committee message to Jaruzelski and party leader Kania. According to the Polish news agency the statement expressed Moscow's concern that anti-Sovietism in Poland has a "precisely determined thrust" which has reached "dangerous limits."

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Holding a session of the Council of Ministers could indicate that the leadership is still trying to work out its strategy. There are rumors in Warsaw that the party Central Committee may meet this weekend. [ ]

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[ ] the leadership had not expected the strong show of militancy at the first session of the union congress and early this week was baffled over how to prevent a repetition at the second session. [ ] the leadership's only choice was to encourage union moderation by making some concessions but did not rule out the possibility that the congress would be banned and those who failed to comply would be arrested. [ ]

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[ ] moderates in the leadership have threatened to resign en masse if Solidarity does not temper its behavior at the second session. [ ]

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In a show of restraint, Solidarity's national press spokesman defended the union against charges that it is seeking confrontation, appealed for calm, said that the union would not be "provoked," and downplayed the politically sensitive resolutions passed at the congress. He

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did, however, aggressively reassert the union's insistence on a far-reaching version of worker self-management. [REDACTED]

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Despite the heightened tensions, union representatives and government censors yesterday worked out compromise wording of the disputed articles planned for publication in the union weekly; the paper was then published. The militant Warsaw chapter of Solidarity, nevertheless, printed the original articles in its local bulletin, which is not subject to censorship. This act of defiance may provoke a regime response. [REDACTED]

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While prompt Soviet publication of Wednesday's statement by the Polish Politburo indicates approval of its criticism of Solidarity, Soviet editing suggests that Moscow may believe Warsaw is still too inclined toward persuasion, rather than action. [REDACTED]

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TASS published most of the Polish statement but omitted its reaffirmation of "socialist renewal" and references to the acceptability of a self-governing trade union. It also omitted those elements in the Politburo's appeal that suggested hesitation in directly challenging the union and implied that Moscow considers the situation more urgent than does Warsaw. [REDACTED]

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#### Low Level of Military Activity

There is no indication of an alert of Polish forces, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] A Polish Army regiment in Warsaw that may have been augmented with reservists early last month--probably as part of contingency planning--appears to be unchanged. Satellite photography of the regiment yesterday showed some 35 tents that had been there since mid-August, and all the regiment's units appeared to be in garrison. [REDACTED]

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Other satellite photography yesterday showed that some Soviet units that participated in exercise Zapad-81 have returned to their garrison at Kaliningrad. Photography of two other divisions in the western USSR showed no unusual activity. [REDACTED]

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USSR - PERSIAN GULF: Soviet Maneuvering

*The USSR is working to establish diplomatic ties with some Arab countries on the Persian Gulf.* [REDACTED]

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Although so far unsuccessful, these low-key but persistent attempts to establish formal relations reflect Soviet ambition to assume a more prominent role in the region. They also are aimed at countering the political influence of the Gulf Cooperation Council. [REDACTED]

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The USSR is combining efforts to establish diplomatic relations with criticism of the conservative Arab states regarding their growing relations with the US. Soviet media, for example, have attacked the proposed AWACS deal and US-Omani military cooperation. [REDACTED]

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At the same time, the Soviets may be tightening links with dissident political groups in the area. [REDACTED]

The Soviets probably also hope that the newly formed alliance of Libya, South Yemen, and Ethiopia will serve their interests by putting psychological pressure on the conservative Arab states. [REDACTED]

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**TURKEY-GREECE: Turkish Views on Greek Election**

*Turkish military leaders would prefer to see the conservative government in Greece reelected on 18 October, but a victory by Socialist leader Papandreou could provide some compensatory benefits for Ankara.* [redacted]

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Prime Minister Rallis and his New Democracy Party have made a commitment to seek conciliation with Turkey, hoping that an image of responsibility in international affairs will improve their election prospects. Bilateral relations have been improving over the past year, and they have been particularly helped recently by the apparent Turkish determination to negotiate seriously on the Aegean and Cyprus. [redacted]

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A Socialist government in Athens would be anathema to the Turkish generals and would reduce the chances of further cooperation. Papandreou, who appears to have at least an even chance of winning the election, has been intransigent toward Turkey. The Turkish commanders fear that, in addition to his extreme nationalism on bilateral disputes, Papandreou would seek to stir up anti-Turkish sentiments among West European Socialists and the EC. [redacted]

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Nevertheless, a victory by Papandreou might provide some advantages for Ankara. It would raise serious questions in the West about Greece's dependability as an ally, and the allies might tend to support Turkey in its disputes with Greece. The Turks, moreover, also might receive more economic and military aid from the West, and the West European allies might ease their pressure to speed up the restoration of civilian rule in Turkey. [redacted]

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Ankara is refraining from commenting on the election campaign to avoid jeopardizing Rallis' chances and to avert accusations of interference. [redacted]

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
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# Coverage of Soviet Ballistic Missile Early Warning Radars



- Estimated coverage of new phased-array radars under construction (Olenegorsk has a phased-array receiver but no transmitter)
- Present early warning radar coverage

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## USSR: Radar Construction

The Soviets probably are improving their radar coverage of the ballistic missile threat from China and parts of the Pacific Ocean. Recent imagery shows clearing and excavation for what may be a phased-array radar facility at the Mishelevka Hen House ballistic missile early warning complex in the eastern USSR. [REDACTED]

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Once operational--probably not before 1987 or 1988--the new radar will provide improved target tracking, data handling, and impact prediction capabilities for areas currently viewed by Hen House radars. The Soviets may construct one or two additional phased-array radars to close the remaining gaps in early warning coverage over the northeastern USSR. [REDACTED]

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## SUDAN: Large-Scale Arrests

The government has rounded up an estimated 7,000 unemployed Sudanese and undocumented refugees in Khartoum since 10 September in an effort to reduce the opportunity for Libyan-sponsored civil disorders and terrorism. Police are searching for hidden arms caches, inspecting vehicles entering and leaving the capital, and reportedly considering imposing a night curfew in Khartoum. The government's actions coincide with protests over food prices in some areas and an abortive mutiny by an Army unit in the south. Security officials probably fear that the refugees, most of whom are Eritreans, might attempt to protest the recent government decision to close the offices of Eritrean rebel organizations in Sudan and disarm Eritrean guerrillas in the country. [REDACTED]

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USSR-EGYPT: Response to Expulsion of Soviet Ambassador

The Soviets yesterday responded to President Sadat's expulsion of the Soviet Ambassador to Egypt by closing the office of the Egyptian military attache in Moscow. Since Sadat had already ordered the attache to return home the action does not entail any reduction in the Egyptian diplomatic presence in the USSR. Moscow apparently does not want to give Sadat a pretext to reduce the Soviet diplomatic presence in Egypt even further. The USSR's low-key public response and limited diplomatic retaliation also suggest that the Soviets are hoping to maintain ties with Egypt, even if they are at a lower level.

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UK: Liberal Party Rejects Cruise Missile Basing

The vote yesterday by Britain's Liberal Party conference to oppose cruise missile basing in the UK will seriously hamper efforts to establish an electoral alliance with the new Social Democratic Party, which strongly supports TNF modernization. Voter support for the alliance is currently stronger than for either party individually, and this will encourage leaders of the two parties to compromise, which may well lead to the blurring of their positions on defense issues.

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Such a development would cause many British voters to reevaluate their support. The Liberal stance, which also rejected the neutron bomb and advocated a European nuclear weapons free zone, will lend considerable credibility to the antinuclear weapons cause in Britain. It could attract voters who oppose nuclear weapons but hesitate to support the badly divided and increasingly leftwing Labor party. But many current supporters of the alliance are likely to be repelled by what they will see as an effort to downgrade British defenses--the Liberals and the Social Democrats also reject Trident--and by the general lack of alliance solidarity. This could work to the benefit of the Conservative Party.

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SIERRA LEONE: Strike Ending

The general strike that began on 1 September is winding down, and most strikers have returned to work, despite President Stevens' refusal to accede to their demands on food prices and other economic issues. Violence could erupt again, however, if Stevens reneges on his promise to release jailed labor leaders. Guinean President Toure has sent a 60-man force to Freetown to provide security for Stevens. [REDACTED]

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Toure took a similar step after a coup attempt against Stevens in 1971, and Guinean troops remained in Sierra Leone for two years. He fears his regime would be threatened by the ouster of the Stevens government because corruption and economic decline also trouble Guinea. Similar issues led to the military takeover last year in neighboring Liberia and the recent coup attempt in The Gambia. [REDACTED]

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SPECIAL ANALYSES

POLAND: Prospects for Confrontation

*The Intelligence Community has sensed a qualitative change in the attitudes of Solidarity and the Polish Communist Party. The former has directly challenged the authority of the Polish party and, indirectly, Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. The latter has indicated a determination to confront Solidarity's challenges if necessary with the use of force.*

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The Polish regime is deeply disturbed by the outcome of the initial phase of the Solidarity Congress. For the first time it appears determined to confront Solidarity in order to prevent a further erosion of its authority and to employ force if the union refuses to back off.

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At its congress, Solidarity issued a set of new and more pointed challenges to party control within Poland and released a statement that inferentially calls into question Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. Solidarity asked for a referendum on worker self-management of enterprises, appealed for free elections to the Polish parliament, called for public control of the mass media, and issued a letter supporting free trade union activity in the USSR and Eastern Europe.

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The government has interpreted Solidarity's line as a challenge to its political primacy. It recognizes, however, that the somewhat disorganized nature of the first phase of the congress was conducive to extreme statements and positions which brought to light divisions within the union. The regime probably hopes to exploit some of these divisions in order to effect a change in the union's posture, preferably before the opening on 26 September of the second phase of the congress.

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The Polish regime has drawn up a detailed plan of military measures, including curfews, shows of force, total military control of the country, and arrest of

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Solidarity leaders. The Polish leadership appears to be readying itself for the possible employment of at least some of these measures in the near future:

- The regime seems to have come to doubt the possibility of reaching an acceptable modus vivendi with Solidarity radicals.
- The regime is considering declaring Solidarity an illegal organization unless it disavows its appeal to Soviet and East European workers.
- A televised Politburo statement on Wednesday accused Solidarity of challenging "vital interests" of the Polish nation and pledged that the government would "use for its defense such means as are required by the situation" to stop the union from taking a course leading to a "confrontation threatening bloodshed."

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The Soviets have interpreted the positions taken by Solidarity at its congress as a frontal challenge to Communist authority not only in Poland but throughout Eastern Europe. They have accused extremist elements in Solidarity of trying to seize political power and have orchestrated factory protest meetings in the USSR and in some East European countries.

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In addition, the Soviets probably seized the opportunity of Jaruzelski's presence in the USSR for the Zapad-81 maneuvers to press him to take decisive action.

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Both the Soviets and the Polish Government have retained some flexibility by concentrating their criticism on extremists within Solidarity. The televised government statement indicates that the regime still hopes to isolate without violence those unspecified Solidarity leaders whom it labels "political madmen," but it is prepared to use force if necessary.

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The Polish leadership is undoubtedly aware of the risks involved in a direct confrontation. It cannot be completely confident of the reaction of the population or of the loyalty of the military rank and file. [ ]

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Even though the regime probably would try to use a carefully modulated initial show of force, it must realize that an abortive limited showdown might inexorably lead to an escalation of violence that could quickly get out of control and precipitate Soviet military intervention--all eventualities which it would like to avoid. [ ]

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Even though there are currently no indications of an immutable government plan of action, [ ]

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[ ] the government and Solidarity, by their separate activities, have created a situation in which the dynamics point to confrontation. For the government, the combination of its televised statement and the scheduled reconvening of the Solidarity congress on 26 September intensify the pressure to assert itself and not back down as it has in the past. [ ]

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The chances of a confrontation leading to the regime's use of force have risen considerably unless the more moderate elements in Solidarity manage to tone down those union actions most objectionable to the government. [ ]

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ZIMBABWE: Reactions to the "Revolution"

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*Several recent actions by the government of Prime Minister Mugabe are increasing apprehensions among the white community, some blacks, and Western investors and aid donors. Mugabe, however, is confident that he can move ahead with the Zimbabwean "revolution" without causing political instability or economic dislocations.*

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Many whites fear the government is preparing to eliminate the remnants of white privilege. The Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs late last month criticized provisions in the constitution that allow for dual citizenship and reserve 20 of the 100 parliamentary seats for whites. The white community of between 175,000 and 190,000 also is troubled by increased taxes, greater restrictions on how much personal property and cash emigrants and vacationers may take out of the country, and the integration of private clubs, health clinics, and schools.

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Whites have been emigrating this year at a rate of about 1,800 per month. A requirement forcing them to give up their South African or British citizenship could prompt a much faster exodus.

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Government Tightening Controls

The tone of recent speeches by Mugabe and other government leaders also has caused concern among some blacks. Mugabe's increasing sensitivity to personal criticism apparently underlies his charge that former Prime Ministers Smith and Muzorewa and other black opposition figures are carrying on subversive activities. Mugabe has threatened to detain Muzorewa evidently because he suspects him of colluding with South Africa in plans to undermine stability in Zimbabwe.

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Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union and the opposition parties are also troubled by the increasing emphasis that Mugabe and other leaders of the ruling

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Zimbabwe African National Union have placed on the desirability of a one-party state. Mugabe and his party have little tolerance for dissent and probably will try at some point to hold a referendum to gain popular approval for a one-party state. [redacted]

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Western, South African, and some Zimbabwean investors are worried that the government's determination to create a Minerals Marketing Board foreshadows a shift toward more radical socialist economic policies. The board will receive revenues from the export of valuable minerals, but whether it will play a role in sales negotiations is unclear. [redacted]

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Recent complaints by Mugabe's critics about deteriorating economic conditions, particularly the alleged mismanagement and inefficiency of transportation facilities, have touched a raw nerve. South Africa's withdrawal a few months ago of 25 locomotives on loan to Zimbabwe has burdened the rail network and contributed to the current shortage of diesel and other fuel. Nearly all Zimbabweans assume that Pretoria is holding back supplies deliberately, as Mugabe and his Minister of Energy have charged, to remind Zimbabwe of its economic dependence on South Africa. [redacted]

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The arrival early last month of about 100 North Korean military advisers also have stirred up Mugabe's foreign and domestic critics. Nkomo has complained that the 5,000-man brigade which the North Koreans are training is composed mainly of Mugabe's ZANU supporters and will be used to impose a one-party state. [redacted]

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#### More Changes

Now that Mugabe has consolidated his grip on power, he will continue to strengthen his control over the pace and direction of the changes in Zimbabwe's institutions and policies. He probably will move cautiously to minimize the risk of instability and of undoing all that has been accomplished. [redacted]

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Despite Mugabe's pragmatic approach, the fears of his black rivals and the whites are not unfounded. For political reasons, Mugabe cannot allow himself to appear less dedicated to Zimbabwean socialism than his potential challengers. Additional moves by the government to control the political and economic life of the country will cause alarm in South Africa, increase concern among Western aid donors and investors, and spur more rapid emigration by the whites.

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